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Abstract 
The present experiment examined the effects of confederate influence on the 
likelihood that participants would claim to have witnessed non-existent footage of a 
highly charged public event.  Forty-eight participants completed a questionnaire, in 
the presence of a confederate, concerning their memory for (non-existent) Closed 
Circuit Television (CCTV) footage of an explosion in a Bali nightclub.  Overall, 19 
participants (39%) claimed falsely to have seen this non-existent footage.  
Furthermore, participants increased or suppressed their false reports in line with 
confirmative or disconfirmative social influence exerted by the confederate.  
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Introduction 
Psychologists have long been interested in memory distortions (Stern, 1910).  
The most influential modern research in this area found that subtle changes in 
wording (e.g. ‘hit’ vs. ‘smashed’) could alter details of participants’ eyewitness 
reports (e.g. the speed a car was travelling when it was involved in an accident; 
Loftus & Palmer, 1974).  This approach to studying memory distortions is usually 
referred to as the ‘misinformation’ method and the effects have been replicated 
extensively, although there is disagreement concerning the exact causes, and extent 
of, the resulting memory distortion (see McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985).  More 
recently, research has begun to address the question of whether it is possible for 
individuals to come to report entire events that did not occur (Loftus & Pickrell, 
1995; Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004).  The focus of this recent 
research has been to address concerns both about the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony (Hyman & Loftus, 2002), as well as the veracity of claims of childhood 
trauma that are made by adults (Brandon et al., 1997; Davies & Dalgleish, 2001; 
Ost, 2003). 
The most influential method is that devised by Loftus and Pickrell (1995) 
who used reports provided by participants’ parents to construct interviews in which 
their participants were asked about ‘real’ and ‘false’ childhood events.  Loftus and 
Pickrell (1995) found that after repeated interviewing and ‘diary work’, a number of 
their participants came to report remembering an entire event (being lost in a 
shopping mall as a child) that, according to their parents, had never happened.  
Subsequent studies using this ‘parental misinformation’ method have replicated 
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these findings several times with different types of event (Hyman, Husband & 
Billings, 1995; Hyman & Billings, 1998; Ost, Foster, Costall & Bull, in press; 
Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge 1997; Porter, Yuille & Lehman, 1999).  More recent work 
has found that even the seemingly harmless task of showing participants old school 
photographs that were contemporaneous with a false childhood event led a high 
number of those participants to report that they could remember the event (Lindsay 
et al., 2004; see also Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002, for similar effects using 
doctored photographs).  Hyman and Loftus (2002) have proposed a three-stage 
model to account for the creation of such false reports.  First they argue that 
individuals must believe the event occurred, secondly they must generate an image 
of the event and, finally, they must make a source monitoring error and misattribute 
their generated image of the event as being a personal memory.  However, this 
model tends to focus on cognitive factors and downplay the equally important role 
that social factors can play in the creation of false reports.  
Social consensus and memory reports 
A growing number of studies of social consensus1 have examined whether 
other people (usually confederates of the experimenter) might be able to influence 
participants’ memory reports (see Bless, Strack & Walther, 2001).  For example, 
Roediger, Meade and Bergman (2001) asked participants to study slides of common 
household scenes and then recall them with a confederate who, unbeknownst to the 
participant, would occasionally incorrectly recall items from the scene.  When 
participants were subsequently asked to recall the items from the scene, they made 
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errors in their recall that were consistent with the misinformation provided by the 
confederate (see also Meade & Roediger, 2002).  Similar effects have also been 
found with other stimulus materials (see Betz, Skowronski & Ostrom, 1996; 
Hoffman, Granhag, Kwong See & Loftus, 2001; Wright, Self & Justice, 2000) and 
in contexts more akin to those in a typical eyewitness scenario. 
Shaw, Garven and Wood (1997), for example, found that participants 
reported incorrect information about a video-presented criminal event they had 
recently witnessed when that incorrect information was presented as having been 
corroborated by another witness (Shaw et al. 1997; experiment 2; see also Gabbert, 
Memon, Allan & Wright, 2004).  Kassin and Kiechel (1996) found that innocent 
participants were more likely to falsely confess to damaging a computer (by hitting 
the “ALT” key on a computer keyboard) when a confederate of the experimenter 
stated (incorrectly) that they had seen the participant hit the key than when the 
confederate claimed not to have seen anything. 
Conformity even occurs in the absence of deliberate misinformation from a 
confederate.  Gabbert, Memon and Allan (2003) asked two participants to watch a 
video of a criminal event (a theft).  Unbeknownst to the participants, there were two 
versions of the video, each shot from slightly different angles.  In only one version 
of the video was the theft clearly visible.  Nevertheless, Gabbert et al. (2003) found 
that after discussing the video with a co-witness, 71% of participants went on to 
mistakenly recall non-witnessed items that had been acquired during the discussion 
(see also Gabbert et al., 2004).  Taken together, these studies suggest that social 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 This more specific term is used in the social influence literature (Pratkanis, in press).  However, in 
the memory literature this effect has also been referred to as ‘co-witness influence’ (Gabbert, Memon 
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influences on memory can be powerful.  Furthermore, a recently developed method 
has shown that these effects also occur with real-life, rather than laboratory-
presented, events (see also Nourkova, Bernstein & Loftus, 2004). 
The ‘crashing memories’ method 
In a novel twist on the misinformation paradigm, Crombag, Wagenaar, and 
van Koppen (1996) distributed a questionnaire asking whether participants had seen 
the (in fact non-existent) film of an air crash in Amsterdam.  They found that 66% of 
participants stated that they had seen the non-existent film and gave further 
information (e.g. the angle that the plane hit the building, at what point fire broke 
out, and the final resting position of the remains of the plane).  They also found that 
female participants were more likely than male participants to report having seen the 
non-existent film.  Ost, Vrij, Costall, and Bull (2002) replicated this finding using a 
different non-existent film and found that 45% of their participants claimed to have 
seen a film of the car crash in Paris, France, in which Diana, Princess of Wales, Dodi 
Fayed and their driver were killed.  Thus, the findings of Crombag et al. (1996) and 
Ost et al. (2002) suggest that the 'crashing memories' method produces robust false 
reports of real-life events (see also Jelicic et al. in press, and Wilson & French, 
submitted, for further recent examples). 
Granhag, Strömwall and Billings (2003) extended the crashing memories 
method by investigating whether social consensus could affect the likelihood of a 
participant claiming to have seen a non-existent film.  Drawing on the work of Asch 
(1951), Granhag et al. (2003) asked two participants (one of whom was a 
confederate of the investigators) to complete a questionnaire about their memory of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
& Allan, 2003; Shaw, Garven & Wood, 1997) or ‘social contagion’ (Meade & Roediger, 2002). 
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a non-existent film of the sinking of the Estonia ferry in 1994, a disastrous accident 
in the Baltic Sea where almost 900 people lost their lives. There were three 
experimental conditions and the confederate behaved differently in each condition.  
In the ‘positive social influence’ condition, the confederate stated out loud "Estonia - 
I remember that film."  In the ‘negative social influence’ condition, the confederate 
stated aloud "Estonia - I do not remember such a film" and in the ‘no social 
influence’ condition the participant completed the questionnaire alone.   
Granhag et al. (2003) replicated the findings of Crombag et al. (1996) and 
Ost et al. (2002) and found that, even in the ‘no social influence’ condition, 52% of 
participants still claimed to have seen the non-existent film.  However, the more 
noteworthy finding was that positive and negative influence appeared to cause 
participants to increase, or suppress their memory reports of the non-existent film.  
In the positive social influence condition, 76% of their participants claimed to have 
seen the non-existent film, compared to 36% in the negative social influence 
condition.  It therefore appears that, although the 'crashing memories' effect is 
robust, the magnitude of the effect can be moderated by the social influence exerted 
by a confederate.  The aims of the present experiment were to attempt to replicate 
the findings of Granhag et al. 
Method 
The ‘false’ footage: The ‘false’ film footage chosen for this experiment was 
Closed Circuit Camera Television (CCTV) footage of the moment of the explosion 
in the Sari nightclub in Bali on October 12th 2002.  News coverage of the Bali 
attacks was broadcast immediately after the event and footage showing the aftermath 
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of the explosions continued to be the main news item for several days, consisting of 
outside shots of the nightclub and debris from the explosion.  Despite the fact that no 
footage showing the actual moment of the explosion was broadcast, pilot data 
indicated that participants were nevertheless likely to claim that they had seen such 
footage.  A questionnaire was therefore devised asking whether participants had seen 
CCTV footage capturing the moment of the explosion in the Sari nightclub in Bali.  
Design:  This experiment employed an independent groups design. A 
confederate was used to manipulate social influence (which was either positive, 
negative or neutral - see below for details of the manipulation).  The dependent 
variable was whether participants claimed to have seen the non-existent CCTV 
footage of the explosion in the Sari nightclub.  In order to control for the possibility 
of order effects found by Granhag et al. (2003), an identical questionnaire was 
included asking participants whether they had seen the televised footage of the 
attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th 2001.  Aside from examining 
possible order effects, no further analyses were conducted with these data2. 
Participants: 48 participants (29 males and 19 females) aged between 18 and 
48 years (M = 21.7 yrs, SD = 4.5 yrs) took part in the experiment. The participants 
were university students (non-psychologists) approached by the investigator in the 
University of Portsmouth’s Student Union.  Participants were systematically 
assigned to conditions (i.e. the first participant was assigned to condition one, the 
second participant was assigned to condition two and so forth). 
Procedure: Participants were approached and asked whether they would be 
willing to participate in an experiment examining their memory for highly charged 
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public events.  They were then taken to a room in the Student’s Union where the 
confederate was already seated.  Participants were then told that they were going to 
be asked to complete two questionnaires concerning their memory of recent highly 
charged public events.  The confederate was introduced as another participant who 
had agreed to take part in the experiment. 
In line with the methodology devised by Granhag et al. (2003), the two 
questionnaires (World Trade Center and Bali - presentation of which was 
counterbalanced) were presented to both the participant and confederate, and the 
confederate then subtly monitored the participants’ progress.  When the participant 
was about to complete the questionnaire about the Bali bombing the confederate did 
one of three things, depending on condition.  In the positive social influence 
condition the confederate stated out loud “Bali - I remember that footage”, in the 
negative social influence condition the confederate stated out loud “Bali - I do not 
remember that footage”, and in the neutral social influence condition the confederate 
remained silent3. 
It is important to note that the, although the confederate spoke aloud, she did 
not address the participant directly - rather it was as if she was talking to herself - 
there was no discussion between the participant and the confederate.  The 
confederate then proceeded to complete the Bali questionnaire.  Once this was 
completed the participant was carefully debriefed about the nature of the experiment 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 Not surprisingly, all 48 participants claimed that they had seen this footage. 
3 Note that there was no attempt to exert influence whilst the participant was completing the World 
Trade Center questionnaire.   
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and the deception was revealed to them.  Interestingly, during debrief, none of the 
participants reported that they remembered the confederate saying anything at all4. 
 
Results 
How many participants reported that they could remember the false event? 
Consistent with previous research, 19 participants (39.6%) claimed to have seen the 
non-existent CCTV footage of the moment that the bomb exploded in the Sari 
nightclub (Crombag et al., 1996; Granhag et al., 2003; Ost et al., 2002).  Analysis 
indicated that the order in which participants completed the questionnaires did not 
have an effect on whether they claimed to have seen the non-existent CCTV footage 
?² (1, N=48) = 0.09, p >.05.  In addition female participants were no more likely to 
claim to have seen the CCTV footage than male participants ?² (1, N=48) = 3.04, p 
>.05. 
Were participants’ reports of the ‘false’ event altered in line with confederate 
influence?  As shown in Table 1, ten participants (62.5%) in the positive social 
influence condition claimed to have seen the non-existent film, compared to six 
(37.5%) in the neutral social influence condition, and three (18.75%) in the negative 
social influence condition.  As the dependent variable was dichotomous (yes/no) and 
resulted in a large number of tied ranks between the three conditions, a Kruskal-
Wallace test was not appropriate.  Therefore this analysis followed the Meddis 
Unified Analysis of Variance of Ranks Test (Meddis, 1984) that bases its 
assumptions about sampling distribution on the existence of such ties. The difference 
                                                               
4 This informal observation requires further research.  The inquiry was made in a casual manner and 
responses were not recorded or systematically examined.  
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between the numbers of participants who claimed to have seen the non-existent 
CCTV footage as a function of confederate influence was statistically significant (H2 
= 7.67, p <.05).  The direction of the pattern (positive > neutral > negative social 
influence) was confirmed by a trend test (Page’s L = 2520.00, p <.005).  
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
Discussion 
The first noteworthy finding is that this experiment replicated the findings of 
previous studies that have adopted the crashing memories method (Crombag et al., 
1996; Granhag et al., 2003; Jelicic et al. in press; Ost et al., 2002; Wilson & French, 
submitted).  The finding that people can be misled to report that they have seen non-
existent film footage appears to be robust as over a third of participants (39.6%), 
irrespective of social influence, claimed to have seen the non-existent CCTV footage 
of the moment of the explosion in the Sari nightclub.  Secondly, the present 
experiment replicated the findings of Granhag et al. (2003) showing that even subtle 
influence exerted by a confederate can both increase or suppress participants’ reports 
of having seen a non-existent film.  Furthermore, contrary to the findings of 
Crombag et al. (1996), male and female participants in the present experiment were 
equally likely to claim to have seen the non-existent footage.  There were also no 
order effects in the present experiment.  This is contrary to the findings of Granhag 
et al. (2003) who found that participants were more likely to claim to remember a 
'false' event if asked about a 'real' event first (see also Porter et al. 1999). 
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Interestingly, during the debriefing, none of the participants spontaneously 
reported that they remembered the confederate speaking.  However, as the 
experimenter inquired about this in a casual manner and participants’ responses were 
not systematically investigated or recorded, we can make no strong claims about the 
possible reasons for participants’ lack of memory for the confederate’s remarks.  
There are, of course, a number of reasons why a participant might claim not to 
remember the confederate’s remarks.  For example, the participant might not have 
mentioned anything for fear of getting the confederate into trouble.  Alternatively, as 
the inquiry was phrased in a casual manner during debrief, participants may not have 
assigned any real importance to the query and thus their apparent lack of memory 
may simply be due to a report bias.  Finally, participants might not have admitted 
hearing the confederate speak because to do so in the presence of the experimenter 
would have been an explicit admission that they had been swayed by what the 
confederate had said.   
Future research should include a more formal manipulation check to 
determine the extent of participants’ awareness of the process of influence.  One way 
to accomplish this   would be to include an extra experimental condition in which 
the confederate speaks out loud but, instead of completing a questionnaire 
concerning their memory of an event, participants complete a filler task instead.  
Participants’ willingness to report that they remember the confederate’s remarks 
could then be compared between conditions where the participant is asked to commit 
to a certain response in line with the confederate’s remarks (e.g. “I can / cannot 
remember the film”) and when they are not. 
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Future work 
Whilst this experiment confirmed that social influence could lead 
participants to either increase, or suppress, their reports of CCTV footage that did 
not exist, it did not examine the other side of the coin.  Can social influence lead 
individuals to suppress reports of events that did occur?  This is an equally important 
question and one that has yet to be satisfactorily addressed by research (Wright, 
Mathews, & Skagerberg, in press).  Wright et al. (in press) have shown that it is 
easier to lead participants to report events that they have not witnessed, than it is to 
lead participants not to report events that they have witnessed.  This apparently 
asymmetric effect of social influence is an important line of research for future 
studies. 
Another important question concerns the longevity of these effects.  Did 
participants just go along with what the confederate said without actually believing 
they had seen the film (public acceptance) or did they truly come to believe the 
responses they gave (private acceptance).  There is only limited evidence that social 
influence can indeed produce an enduring change in memory reports.  For example, 
Shaw, Garven and Wood (1997) found that participants incorporated incorrect co-
witness information into their own accounts of a video-presented robbery, and this 
effect persevered in a memory test 48 hours later.  In other words, participants in 
Shaw et al.’s study reported incorrect details when not in the presence of the co-
witness, demonstrating not only public acceptance but also a degree of private 
acceptance of the misinformation they were exposed to. 
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Related to this point is that, although a number of participants in the current 
experiment appear to have been swayed by the social influence exerted by the 
confederate, it is not clear why they complied (see also Gabbert et al., 2003).  Did 
participants initially make reports in line with those of the confederate because of 
the social pressure of not wishing to appear to contradict the confederate (normative 
influence), or because they assumed the confederate provided the correct answer and 
wanted to do so themselves (informational influence).  In the present study the issues 
of normative versus informational influence were difficult to disentangle.  As 
participants in the present study were not required to state their choices out loud (cf. 
Shaw et al. 1997) but to write them down on a questionnaire in the presence of a 
confederate this would suggest that their responses were due, in part, to 
informational processes (Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) or that 
participants’ reports were the result of erroneous source monitoring decisions 
(Crombag et al. 1996; Ost et al. 2002).  This explanation would also be consistent 
with the results of previous studies where no confederate influence was exerted 
(Crombag et al., 1996; Ost et al. 2002; Jelicic et al., in press; Wilson & French, 
submitted).  However, the effect of the confederate influence condition on the 
number of positive responses suggests that normative processes were also clearly at 
work.  It could be argued that participants who claimed to have seen the non-existent 
footage succumbed to normative influence because they did not want to appear 
deviant by claiming not to be able to remember, in the presence of the confederate, 
the tragic events in the Bali nightclub (Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955).  Likewise, participants in the ‘negative social influence’ condition may have 
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thought they remembered the film, but may not have reported this because they too 
did not want to appear deviant by contradicting the confederate.  In order to 
determine the extent of normative versus information influence further research is 
necessary. 
The existing literature suggests that there are several ways to explore some of 
these issues.  Firstly, as mentioned above, a delay could be incorporated into testing 
(Shaw et al. 1997).  This would show whether participants at a later date, in the 
absence of any influence from a confederate, still report that they remember seeing 
the non-existent film.  If their responses on the delayed test were different from the 
responses they made in the presence of the confederate then this might be evidence 
to support the role of normative influence, and public, rather than private, 
acceptance.   
A second way to test this would be to ask participants to make two sets of 
confidence judgments, one in the presence of the confederate and a second in private 
(Wright et al., 2000).  Again, discrepancies between these two ratings would indicate 
whether confidence expressed in public (i.e. in the presence of the confederate) also 
held when the confederate was not present.  A third method, following the work of 
Meade and Roediger (2002) would be to ask participants to make source monitoring 
judgments.  Participants could be asked to state whether they ‘remember’ the film, 
or simply ‘know’ that they have seen it or could be given the opportunity to attribute 
the source of the information to the confederate, rather than their own memories.  
Again, there is evidence that under certain circumstances such source monitoring 
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tests can provide evidence of private acceptance of misinformation (Meade & 
Roediger, 2002). 
A final method to test the degree of private versus public acceptance would 
be to adopt the method used by Kassin and Kiechel (1996).  They found that 
participants were willing to repeat to a third party their false confession that they had 
indeed pressed the key which caused the computer to crash.  If participants in the 
present study had been willing to report their memory of the non-existent film to a 
third party, this again would have indicated a degree of private acceptance (or 
‘internalization’; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Kassin, 2005) of their false belief.   
The issue of the social influences on remembering has implications for many 
applied areas: the reliability of multiple witnesses to a crime (Gabbert et al. 2003; 
Shaw et al. 1997); police interrogations of suspects (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; 
Kassin, 2005); or clients remembering episodes of past trauma in support groups 
(Ost, in press).  There are also many tactics, other than social consensus, which 
could be explored with regards to the social influences on remembering (Cialdini, 
2001; Pratkanis, in press).  Therefore the degree to which people are influenced (and 
in some cases come to believe) misinformation provided by other people remains an 
important question to be addressed by future research. 
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Table 1. Number of participants who claimed to have seen the non-existent footage 
as a function of social influence (positive, neutral, or negative). 
 
 
N=48 
Positive social 
influence 
No social influence Negative social 
influence 
 
Saw footage 
 
10 
 
6 
 
3 
 
Did not see footage 
 
6 
 
10 
 
13 
  
